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Article 48 TEC 
‘Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and 
having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business 
within the Community shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be treated in the same 
way as natural persons who are nationals of Member States.’ 
 
The recognition of companies under the differing theories of Company law among 
Member States has always served to potentially undermine one of the fundamental 
freedoms of EC law, freedom of establishment, to the extent of rendering it practically 
impossible for a legal person to move it’s registered office1 between some member 
states without liquidation and re-incorporation in the new state, no easy or simple task 
and one that gives rise to a range of taxation liabilities.  Article 43 TEC (old Art 52) 
grants free movement of establishment to natural and legal persons, and Article 48 
(old 58) quoted above clarifies this right and then goes on to state how a ‘company or 
firm’ is to be defined under European law. 
 
Faced with this seemingly intractable problem, Freedom of Establishment has in 
certain cases remained a theoretical right only for some European companies – 
secondary legislation to enforce or clarify Member State obligations has not been 
forthcoming2 and the legal and political will to challenge the status quo has been non-
existent.  After the cases of Centros3, Uberseering4, and Inspire Art5, the claim by 
commentators is now that following these judicial pronouncements, effective 
enforcement of Arts 43 and 48 are achieved and secondary legislation is no longer 
necessary.  European Community problems have been solved – again – by an active 
Court of Justice willing to bring recalcitrant member states to heel over their treaty 
obligations.   
 
This paper will suggest that the case decisions, while to be welcomed within their 
restricted remit, simply do not address the problems of primary establishment caused 
particularly by the affiliation of some member states to the ‘real seat’ doctrine, and if 
the Community is serious about taking the internal market forward with the concept 
of the truly European Company, then legislation, possibly in the form of the long-
awaited and increasingly unlikely to happen Fourteenth Company law Directive, is a 
must.  This will serve two purposes, firstly to force member states to face up to their 
obligations under treaty law in a way consistent with other areas of free movement, 
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1 Or central administration or principal place of business as alternates under Article 48. 
2 Contrast with free movement of workers 
3  Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v Erhervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459  
4 Case C-208/00 Uberseering v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement – not yet reported 
5 Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd 
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where fundamental treaty rights are at stake, and secondly, to clarify the scope of 
justificatory restraints on the freedom of establishment for companies in order to 
uphold the uniformity and coherence of Community law. 
 
 
The Problem  
 
Article 48 instructs member states to treat a legal person, i.e. a company or firm, the 
same way as it would be obliged to treat a natural person, i.e. a citizen of a member 
state and hence a citizen of Europe6 wishing to establish themselves in another 
member state (the host state) other than their country of origin (the home state).  
Although this is qualified in later case law where the ECJ recognises that a legal 
person is in a more complicated situation than a natural person by virtue of them 
being able to have a presence in more than one place simultaneously, and hence the 
provisions cannot be exactly analogous.  Problems arise from the different ways that 
member states recognise the legal personality of a company, and the nationality of the 
law that applies to that organisation within their systems of company law.  Broadly 
speaking, a member state will either subscribe to the ‘incorporation’ theory or the 
‘real seat’ theory, although the Nordic registration system at issue in Inspire Art could 
be seen as a different system, in reality it is simply a modified application of the 
incorporation theory. 
 
Member state systems that work on the incorporation theory recognise a company as a 
legal person, with all the protection that involves for the individuals behind the veil, 
providing it is incorporated in one of the other member states.  The company is also 
deemed to operate under the company rules of the member state in which it is 
incorporated.  Therefore a company (P) incorporated under English law, but with it’s 
head office or principle place of business in another member state, would be seen as a 
valid legal person, subject to English company law, in another incorporation state, for 
example, Ireland or the Netherlands.  In this scenario, the approximation of a legal 
person to a natural one is unproblematic, a company is seen as a creature of the 
member state under which it is created, much the same as a citizen of a member state 
must be accepted by other member states as a citizen of Europe.  However, such a 
company would only be recognised and seen to be subject to English law in Germany, 
a ‘real seat’ theory state, if the company’s central office or main place of business was 
also within England.  If P was incorporated in England but actually had it’s head 
office and main place of business in France, German law would recognise French law 
as the system which is applicable to that company.  If P were not incorporated under 
French law and was therefore not a legal person in that respect, neither would German 
law recognise P as a legal person.  The problem becomes more complicated still when 
a real seat company refuses to recognise a company which has incorporated under it’s 
own laws, but whose main centre of business has become another state.  P would then 
not be recognised within it’s ‘home state’ and therefore would not be recognised even 
by incorporation states as it will not be a legal person in respect of it’s home country’s 
company law. The above is an approximation of the general way in which the ‘real 
seat’ theory works, although different member states may allow the emigration of 
companies subject to shareholder votes and the amendment of company constitutions.  
These processes are often complicated however, and may in reality demand 
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liquidation and a re-incorporation in the host state, something a company will wish to 
avoid.  Italy on the other hand, will recognise a foreign company on the basis of 
reciprocity for the recognition of Italian companies in the other member state.  This is 
a particularly bizarre state of affairs given the ECJ’s robust rejection of the concept of 
reciprocity in other areas of European law – the Treaty, it has stated, ‘gives rise to 
absolute obligations, not reciprocal ones.’7  From a European, free movement angle 
then, the incorporation theory is to be much preferred over the ‘real seat’ theory. 
 
This may seem a more theoretical problem than a practical one, Drury8 makes the 
point that a company incorporated in a particular member state should not want to 
move it’s head office out of that state with all the disruption and cost that would 
entail, particularly when modern means of communication facilitate business 
worldwide, when it will be simpler and cheaper for it just to open a branch office in 
another member state.  He goes on however, to suggest that a company may open a 
branch in a host state which becomes very successful and over time, the de facto head 
office of a company incorporated in another member state.  In such a scenario, if the 
home state is an incorporation state, it will recognise the company, and therefore so 
will other incorporation states.  If the home state is a real seat theorist, then it, and 
hence all other member states will not recognise it as a valid company.  Real seat 
supporters say this is justified in order to ensure that the law most relevant to that 
company is the one that governs it, and therefore if a company doesn’t conform to the 
laws of that country, other states should not recognise it as a company at all.  The 
joint and several liability which will then arise in respect of the directors of the 
company should act as an incentive for those individuals to conform to the laws of the 
country where their business is carried out, to the benefit of the customers, creditors 
and shareholders of that company. 
 
The real question is how has this state of affairs existed for so long within a 
Community which proclaims as one of its guiding principles the creation of, ‘an area 
without internal frontiers in which free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital is ensured.’9  Article 48 specifically gives a choice of three different 
connecting factors between a company and a member state, registered office, central 
administration or principle place of business, to take account of the different systems 
of company law used within the Community, and there is a further obligation upon 
member states in Article 293; 
 
‘Member states shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations with each other 
with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals………the mutual recognition 
of companies for firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 48, the 
retention of legal personality in the event of transfer of their seat from one country to 
another…’10 
 
At the time of writing, no such negotiations have been entered into on the basis of 
Article 293, but this doesn’t detract from the clear legal duty of member states, under 
articles 43, 48, 293 and 10 to give effect to treaty obligations, yet Article 234 
                                                 
7 Cases 90 & 91/63 Commission v Luxembourg and Belgium (re import of Powdered Milk Products) 
[1964] ECR 625 
8 R Drury ‘Migrating Circumstances’ 1999 – 24 European Law Review 
9 Article 14(2) TEC 
10 Article 293 TEC 
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references to the ECJ appear to have been unhelpful in this respect and article 226 or 
227 actions have not been brought.  Conventions which have aimed to harmonise 
member states laws, such as the Convention on the Mutual Recognition of 
Companies, have foundered because member states have refused to ratify them11.  It is 
against this background, that the exploration of the recent case law should be set. 
 
The case law  
 
Centros12  
Centros was incorporated and hence obtained its legal personality under English law.  
The directors of the company were both Danish, and in fact the company never did 
any business at all in England, it traded only in Denmark.  Danish authorities refused 
to register the company on the grounds that it was incorporated in England only to 
avoid the minimum paid up share capital provision that was required by Danish 
company law.13  On an Article 234 reference the ECJ held that the refusal to register 
the company by the Danish was contrary to Articles 52(43) and 58 (48), and that the 
avoidance of the relevant provision of Danish law was not a justification for the 
breach.  The court did say that Denmark could take measures to combat fraud or to 
intervene if the company was trying to avoid obligations towards public or private 
creditors in Denmark.  
 
Uberseering14 
Uberseering was formed under the law of the Netherlands and had it’s registered 
office there, but subsequently, according to Germany, transferred its real seat to 
Germany.  Germany is a real seat theory state, and as the company was not formed 
according to it’s laws, German would not recognise Uberseering as a legal person able 
to be a party to legal proceedings within the state.  The ECJ held that Germany could 
not refuse to recognise Uberseering and locus standii must be granted, dismissing an 
argument that a negotiation under Art 293 was necessary, and distinguishing the Daily 
Mail15 case from the one at hand.   
 
Inspire Art16 
Inspire Art was incorporated under English law, but was operational only in the 
Netherlands.  The Dutch WFBV17 required ‘formally foreign’ companies to register as 
such and imposed extra duties upon such companies as regards administrative 
procedures and filing of documents.  The ECJ held these requirements to be in breach 
of EC law, in so far as they required procedures not covered by the second, fourth and 
eleventh company law Directives.  As these directives were meant to harmonise 
member state laws in this respect, their requirements were exhaustive.  To hold 
otherwise would plainly defeat the object of harmonisation altogether.  Further, 
although Article 12 of the eleventh directive provides that Member states may impose 
‘appropriate penalties’, it was for the national court to decide if the imposition of joint 
                                                 
11 In this case the Dutch 
12 Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v Erhervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459  
13 Some £17,000 as opposed to £100 in the UK. 
14 Case C-208/00 Uberseering v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement – not yet reported 
15 Case 81/87 R v HM Treasury Ex p. Daily Mail [1988] ECR 5483 
16 Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd 
17 Wet op de Formeel Buitenlandse Vennootschappen. 
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and severable liability for directors and auditors18 was proportionate and non-
discriminatory. 
 
The Netherlands argued that the Company was in fact recognised under Dutch law, 
(an incorporation theorist), and therefore there could be no breach of the freedom of 
establishment.  The rules were likewise non-discriminatory as they aimed to give 
protection to those dealing with the company, a mandatory requirement of Dutch law 
which was also imposed on Dutch companies.  Such ‘Brass Plate’ companies, said the 
Dutch, should not fall under Articles 43 and 48 at all, as those rules refer to secondary 
establishment, and are concerned with allowing an established company to spread into 
other domains.  The issue here was one of primary establishment, as the main, indeed 
the only branch of Inspire Art was in the Netherlands, therefore, it was to Dutch law 
that it ought to comply.   The ECJ rejected these arguments and held that the WFBV 
was contrary to Articles 43 and 48 in so far as it imposed restrictions on companies 
validly constructed in another member state.  This breach was neither allowable under 
Article 46 nor justified by overriding reasons related to public interest as they were 
ineffective and disproportionate. 
  
The point was made by the Court, both in Inspire Art and Centros, that investors or 
creditors will know the company is incorporated in the UK and are thus free to make 
up their own minds whether to invest or not, or whether they should obtain additional 
guarantees from the company in question. It was also said that had Centros carried out 
the tiniest amount of business in the UK, the Danish would not have refused 
registration, but arguably creditors and investors were potentially in as much peril 
from sharp business practice in that situation as in the present one.  The refusal to 
register in Centros and the extra procedures in Inspire Art were thus held to be 
disproportionate and ineffective. 
 
The case law and the judgements show a welcome methodology from the ECJ, which 
is in line with other free movement pronouncements.  Firstly, is the national law 
dissuasive of free movement of companies?  If so, is there a derogation available 
under Article 46, and if not, may a measure fall within a member states mandatory 
requirements, being objectively justified, non-discriminatory and proportionate. 
 
The Problem Still?  
 
One of the first things to notice about the above case law was that two of the decisions 
involved member states which adhere to the incorporation theory of company law, 
and therefore implicitly recognised the legal personality of the incoming company 
anyway, according to their own laws.  With this in mind, it can plainly be seen as 
discriminatory to refuse to register such a company, or to impose extra duties upon it, 
by clear analogy to free movement of goods case law where mutual recognition 
makes it unlawful for a state to deny a product entry to it’s market, or to make the 
producers comply with extra specifications unneeded in the products home state.  
Uberseering is the only judgement which directly calls into question a member states 
adherence to the sticking point in freedom of establishment, the real seat doctrine, 
dealing as it does with Germany, but even this case, it is contended, has little to do 
with a widening of the concept of primary establishment within the Community. 
                                                 
18 Except if within the remit of the fourth company law directive, which Inspire Art was.  
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All the cases quoted fail to address the main problem of primary establishment, the 
fact that the home member state in question still has full freedom to choose whether 
or not a company has legal personality within that state in the first place.  If the issue 
is primary establishment, that is, the initial registration of a company, member state F 
can decide how that initial registration must proceed.  An incorporation state will have 
a rule of incorporation which will be unconcerned with the geographical location of 
the main place of business or head office of that company, a real seat state will require 
that both are situated within it’s territory.  Although Uberseering appears to have dealt 
with the problem of a company, M, moving out of a state it was validly incorporated 
within, it does not touch upon the problem of M wishing to move out of state F where 
the real seat theory holds sway. Once F’s chosen ‘connecting factor’ is gone from that 
state, F will no longer recognise M as valid and therefore neither will another member 
state.  The point of Article 48 holds up here only if the phrase ‘formed in accordance 
with the law of a member state’ is taken literally in that if – in a real seat state – the 
real seat is present within the member state at the time of incorporation, then that 
company cannot thereafter ‘lose’ it’s incorporated status by subsequently moving it’s 
real seat out of that states territory. If this interpretation is not given, then a company 
moving it’s real seat out of a state that adheres to the real seat theory is not a company 
formed in accordance with the law of a member state and falls without the protection 
of Article 48.  If the question of citizenship of a natural person is solely the concern of 
that persons home member state, then it isn’t open to that person, denied citizenship in 
one member state, to move across the border and claim all the rights of European 
citizenship in another.  Likewise, it is difficult to see how a company failing to meet 
the laws required for its incorporation in a member state, whatever those laws may be, 
can demand to be seen as a valid company by the rest of the European Community.  
Articles 43 and 48 simply do not seem to give that right, nor should they. 
 
Even more bizarrely, the phrase ‘formed in accordance with the law of a member 
state, could be taken to mean formed in accordance with the laws of ANY member 
state, irrespective of the laws of the state the potential company is present in.  A 
company could then demand that a real seat theorist like Germany incorporate it along 
the lines of the UK, where the concept of the ‘brass plate’ company is no problem as 
the registered office is the ‘connecting factor’ under English law. Although this would 
amount to a beneficial harmonisation of company law under the treaty, member 
state’s outrage and intractability would not be difficult to imagine. 
 
In this respect, Article 293, although sidelined by the judgements with which we are 
concerned, seems to be paramount.  In Daily Mail the ECJ said: 
 
‘Treaty regards the differences in national legislation concerning the required 
connecting factor and the question of whether – and if so how – the registered office 
or real head office of a company incorporated under national law may be transferred 
from one Member State to another as problems which are not resolved by the rules 
concerning the right of establishment.’ 
 
Siems is of the opinion that the validity of the differing systems is therefore 
recognised and ventures that harmonisation by directive is the only way forward19, but 
                                                 
19 Mathius Siems, “ Convergence, Competition, Centros and Conflicts of Law: European law in the 21st 
Century” (2002) European Law Review 27(1), pp 47-59 
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this view seems to overlook Article 293 and the clear requirement for negotiations to 
allow companies to, inter alia, retain legal personality in the event of migration. 
In Uberseering the emphasis was on the phrase ‘so far as necessary’ and in that case, 
and the others, as the companies concerned fell within the definition in Article 48, the 
rights under Article 43 accrued to them and no further examination of the treaty was 
necessary.  In our example of state F and company M above however, there would 
seem to be an obligation on F to enter into negotiations for the mutual recognition of 
M, with other member states even if it does move it’s real seat and hence becomes 
unrecognisable as a company under F’s laws national laws.  The negotiations thus 
entered into would then force F to recognise a company that had moved it’s real seat 
out of it’s territory as well as a company moving it’s real seat into F, while still – 
presumably – being subject to the laws of it’s home member state.  How this would 
work, and which national laws would apply in these scenario’s would, of course, 
depend on the negotiations themselves.  To take this to it’s natural conclusion, it 
would seem every member state is under such an obligation except incorporation 
states, a status reinforced by Article 10 TEC. 
 
To this extent, the case law examined, does not concern primary establishment at all, 
but the problem of previously denied rights to secondary establishment clearly given 
under Articles 43 and 48.  The fact that the Centros, Uberseering and Inspire Art 
judgements clearly uphold these rights is to be welcomed, but in fact the decisions 
appear to go not much further than already decided case law such as Commission v 
France20 and Segers21.  Indeed, in Segers the ECJ stated;   
 
‘All that is required is the formation of a company under the law of a Member State, 
not necessarily the Member State in question.’22 
 
And in Commission v France, the ECJ made clear that the risk of a company evading 
taxes is not to be relied upon where a fundamental freedom such as establishment is 
involved,23 a point re-emphasised in later cases.  Why then the fuss about the Centros 
line of case law?  Possibly because these later cases happened after the ‘seminal’ 
judgement in Daily Mail.  Daily Mail appeared to throw previous case law into 
confusion as the ECJ found the necessity of British Treasury consent to a movement 
of a company’s head office was not in breach of European law.  The ECJ in later 
cases has however been at pains to distinguish Daily Mail, and it could be submitted 
that it was a creature of it’s time and especially of it’s circumstances, which were 
unusual.  The Daily Mail wished to move it’s head office to the Netherlands where it 
would not be liable for capital gains tax when it sold assets which would accrue the 
tax under English law. The company did not wish to move any assets or to do any 
business in the Netherlands, but in effect wished to change it’s nationality, the reverse 
of what has happened in other cases examined where a company wishes to retain it’s 
nationality under the state in which it was incorporated, but simply sought that other 
member states should recognise that nationality.  As the creation of English law, it is 
relevant that the Daily Mail should comply with English law before it is able to don 
another legal personality in a foreign state, the Treasury was not preventing the 
                                                 
20 Case 270/83 Commission v France [1986] ECR 273 
21 Case 79/85 Segers v Bedrijfsvereniging voor Bank en Verzekeringswezen [1987] 2 CMLR 247 
22 See paragraph 16 of judgement – emphasis added. 
23 Paragraph 25 of judgement 
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movement as such, simply asking that the company settle it’s tax liability24 
beforehand. 
 
Centros, Uberseering and Inspire Art then, appear to restate and clarify, and, to an 
extent extend the reasoning found in Commission v France and Segers in so far as 
they have made clear that a ‘real seat’ member State cannot refuse to recognise a 
company validly formed under the law of another member state.  This is the concept 
of the freedom of secondary establishment under Articles 43 and 48.  None of the 
cases above however relate to the primary establishment of companies.  The point has 
already been made that Article 48 will not protect companies if they are not formed in 
accordance with the law of a member State, the quote above from the Daily Mail case 
seems to suggest the ECJ is comfortable with this, and sees primary establishment as 
a question for member states.  If member states are not to be in breach of EC law 
however, they must fulfil their obligations under the Treaty.  It could be suggested  
that this area of law is not one that should be left to judicial sensibilities to develop, 
but should be served by specific secondary legislation.  This eminently sensible point 
could be countered by the submission that secondary legislation is not necessary when 
the primary legislation, Art 293 is already there. 
 
However, given the complexities of Article 293 and the logistics of all 15 (soon to be 
25) Member States having to enter into agreements with everybody else to the same 
ends, some form of harmonising legislation would be a more uniform and effective 
way to go forward.  Unless absolute harmonisation was desired – and this is difficult 
to envisage – it could be suggested, in line with other areas of EC law, that a 
minimised harmonisation regime could be adopted.  This may be problematic.  It 
would doubtless allow member states to impose more stringent standards on it’s own 
companies than it is allowed to impose on those moving in, which is, in effect, the 
situation the law is in at the moment. This would suggest the need for more robust 
rules in the area of primary establishment, in order to facilitate the concept of a 
‘European Company’ and to counter any perceived ‘race to the bottom’ for member 
states national law in an effort to attract companies wishing to incorporate in the state 
where it is easiest and cheapest for them to do so25. 
 
The proposed Fourteenth Company Law Directive suggests a ‘third way’ for 
companies wishing to move their ‘real seats’ out of any member state, which is not 
dependant on either the incorporation or the real seat theory – although incorporation 
states will have to get used to the biggest change in procedure.  Companies complying 
with this method of corporate mobility will retain their legal personality throughout 
the Community.26 Potential problems with this approach are easy to see, in trying to 
please both the incorporation and the real seat theorists, the Commission may have 
ended up pleasing no-one, with incorporation states resentful at the major changes 
required in their laws, and real seat states unhappy at a ‘watering down’ of their 
robust ‘connecting factor’ ideals.  The proposal also makes clear that refusing 
recognition within the framework must be subject to stringent controls and 
requirements of legitimate general interest, proportionality, minimum intervention, 
                                                 
24 The Daily Mail argued that it should not be liable for tax that has yet to accrue, as is the case of 
capital gains tax, before a profit is realised. 
25 But see Siems Article fn 18 post for an argument why the ‘Delaware effect’ in Europe may be more 
feared than likely to happen. 
26 See article by Drury fn 8 post  
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non-discrimination and transparency.  It must be noted however, that due to problems 
encountered with ‘employee participation’ under the proposed Directive, this 
legislation is at least on hold, and possibly, after years in conception, doomed  to 
failure. 
 
Conclusion  
 
If the foregoing arguments are accepted and Community rules are thereby imperative 
to solve the problem of diverse primary establishment procedure under national laws, 
then maybe the courses of action open to the Community are few.  Such a substantial 
and fundamental concept should not be left in the hands of the ECJ to develop 
incrementally over time, unless the Court is to be concerned with the application of 
the Treaty as it stands, namely the effective enforcement of Article 293.  Article 234 
references and actions under Art 230 for failure to act may be appropriate here.  Clear 
rules concerning primary establishment are, it is to be argued, a matter for legislation. 
If member state opposition was no object, then the demise of the real seat doctrine 
altogether would be welcomed, an EU that operated purely on the incorporation 
theory would be one with very few problems of either primary or secondary 
establishment, but the reality is that real seat states, particularly Germany, would 
fiercely defend their right to choose the ‘connecting factor’ of a particular company to 
the state, a choice explicitly recognised under Article 48 anyway.  Therefore the 
Fourteenth Company Law Directive must be saved from failure, and presented as a 
commonsense and diplomatic way of solving a problem that has gone on for too long.  
The European Company Statute has shown that agreement in these matters can be 
reached and may provide a model of good practice in this area.  Unless it does, the 
creation of ‘an area without internal frontiers in which free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital is ensured,’ is as far away as ever. 
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